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This article examines the labor market outcomes and political preferences of majority,
minority, or migrant individuals who report that they live in an ethnic enclave—a
neighborhood with few majority residents. Politicians often proclaim that ethnic
enclaves are problematic, but there is little rigorous examination of these claims.
The ethnic composition of a local residential area can affect its inhabitants negatively by
increasing conflict and competition (real or perceived) between groups. Majority
members may feel their economic and political power questioned and think that the
resources to which they are entitled have been usurped by newcomers. Migrants and
minorities can be negatively impacted by isolation from the mainstream society, and
their integration attempts can be hindered in ethnically concentrated local areas. Using
data from the 2002 and 2014 waves of the European Social Survey, enriched with
contextual data, we examine the impact of ethnic enclaves accounting for selection and
compositional differences. We do not find evidence that minority concentrated areas
impact negatively upon the economic outcomes of majority members, not even of
those in precarious positions. We do however find that residence in enclaves is
associated with greater propensity to vote for the far right and dissatisfaction with
democracy for the majority group. Furthermore, there is an economic enclave penalty
associated with the labor market insertion of migrants and the job quality of the second
generation, and ethnic enclaves also increase the dissatisfaction with democracy
among the second generation. We discuss our findings in light of the threat and
contact literature.
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INTRODUCTION
Increased migration to and within Europe has made ethnic diversity in local areas an everyday
experience for majority populations across Europe (Iceland, 2014; Laméris et al., 2018). While
residential segregation is not as high as in the United States, migrants and their children often live
concentrated in more deprived areas than the majority (Semyonov et al., 2012). Such spatial local
concentration of migrants and minorities is often referred to as an ethnic enclave (Portes and
Zhou, 1993; Waldinger, 1994) and is interpreted by politicians as problematic, hindering
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While important, little is known empirically about the impact
of residential isolation from the mainstream society. In this
article, we use cross-nationally comparable European data to
study whether there is an association between the perceived
ethnic composition in the local residential area and two sets of
outcomes: on one hand, labor market outcomes, and on the other
hand, political behavior. In this way, we capture the distinction
between threat to labor market position (heightened competition
should result in observed poor labor market outcomes) and threat
to political power (which should result in greater support of far-
right parties which programs frequently stoke such fears, or
higher salience of political nationalism and dissatisfaction with
democracy).
We contribute to the literature first by comparing how ethnic
enclaves affect majority members as well as migrants and
minorities and by providing valuable insights into the conflict
and contact mechanisms at work. Second, we make use of
propensity score matching methods to account directly for
selection into local areas as selection on observables can be a
major part of the story. Third, we account for the influence of
important mediating factors such as the regional employment
rate, the friendship contacts of our respondents, and
neighborhood social disorganization captured by fear of crime.
This study relies on a measure of the perceived ethnic
composition of the local area. One limitation of our data is
the possible variability in subjective perceptions of the area’s
residential composition. Nevertheless, previous research has
demonstrated that perceptions matter—it is the perceived
rather than the actual size of the minority population that is
more likely to increase anti-minority sentiment (Semyonov et al.,




Selection Into Ethnic Enclaves
Migrants and minorities may concentrate in less-desirable areas
as they are cheaper, through a higher reliance on social housing
(Semyonov and Glikman, 2009), or can be pushed there by
housing discrimination (Boeri et al., 2015). Migrants and
minorities may also seek out ethnic enclaves as they can offer
shelter from discrimination and access to ethnic goods and
positive social and cultural connections (Portes and Zhou,
1993; Zhou, 1994; Zhou, 2005; Bécares et al., 2009). These
areas, however, are often more deprived and can provide
fewer good job prospects (Feng et al., 2015). It is therefore
important to account for selection into ethnic enclaves when
estimating their impact (Edin et al., 2003; Damm, 2009;
Andersson et al., 2013; Boeri et al., 2015).
The Threat to Economic or Political Power
and the Ethnic Enclave
The ethnic composition of a local residential area can affect its
inhabitants negatively by increasing conflict and competition
(real or perceived) between groups (Blalock, 1967; Glikman
and Semyonov, 2012). Majority members can feel their
economic and political power questioned and think that the
resources to which they are entitled have been usurped by
newcomers (Vervoort, 2012). In this study, we focus on both
dimensions and examine the impact of the ethnic enclave on
labor market outcomes (economic position) and vote for far-right
parties, feeling close to the far right and dissatisfaction with
democracies (which demonstrates the salience of political
nationalism observed when political power is threatened).
There is inconclusive evidence of whether there is labor
market competition between migrants and majority members.
Some studies find a somewhat negative effect of increasing
migration on earnings and employment of the majority
(Dustmann et al., 2013; Bratsberg et al., 2014; Brücker et al.,
2014); while others find positive or no effects (Bellini et al., 2013;
Akay et al., 2014; Dustmann and Frattini, 2014; Aleksynska and
Tritah, 2015; Ehrlich and Kim, 2015; Peri et al., 2015;Mayda et al.,
2018). While competition is mainly measured at the regional
level, there is some evidence at the local level (primarily based on
United Kingdom data) for increased competition between
migrants and majority members, with migrants affecting
majority members’ employment probability negatively
(Dustmann et al., 2017). Boeri et al. (2015) show a negative
effect of the extra local area competition on migrants in Italy.
Zwysen and Demireva (2020) show that the presence of migrants
does not really lead to worsening of the job quality of majority
members, but there are adverse effects for migrants and some
minority groups.
Is there an association between residing in ethnic enclaves and
political behavior? The research on this topic is also somewhat
contradictory. Pardos-Pardo et al. (2014) found evidence that
concerns over immigration strengthen the identification of
majority members with the center-right party that owns this
immigration issue. Halla et al. (2017), using Austrian data,
reported a strong association between increasing immigrant
influx in a community and the voting share for the Freedom
Party of Austria. The greater presence of migrants becomes
associated with the economic concerns of the majority for
their labor market position on one hand and with fear for
access to amenities on the other. Most recently, concerns have
shifted to refugees (Dinas et al., 2019; Dustmann et al., 2019).
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to identify who majority
members perceive as an outgrouper. Moreover, despite the
economic benefits of migration, majority members may see
either their economic position threatened by mass migration
(Becker and Fetzer, 2016) or their political power challenged and
seriously eroded (Tabellini, 2020). Thus, there are several
indications that the ethnic enclave can bring about discontent
on the part of majority members. First of all, according to the
threat framework, the ethnic enclave will increase the proximity
between different ethnic groups, while at the same time majority
members constitute a minority in this setting (Kawalerowicz,
2021). Second, enclaves are also characterized by higher levels of
structural disadvantage and economic insecurity, and deprivation
may act to strengthen identification with populist projects
(Margalit, 2019) and opposition to outgroupers (Hjerm, 2009;
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Finseraas and Kotsadam, 2017). Left-behind voters can become
disillusioned with the democratic process and react in relation to
broader grievances that are associated with their changed
economic position over time rather than with the presence of
migrants or minority members in their local area (Hjerm, 2009;
Matti and Zhou, 2017; Haaland and Roth, 2020). Whereas this
study examines a variety of mediating factors and looks at the
outcomes and preferences of majority individuals in precarious
economic positions, our analysis does not allow us to examine
changes to local areas over time either in terms of deprivation or
minority composition and identify respondents who can be
considered “left behind.” Finally, studies have shown that
settled migrants and minorities can also have strong
reservations against migrants and may act to preserve their
established positions (Just and Anderson, 2015).
Research Expectation 1: Salience of Economic Threat. The
residence in the ethnic enclave can bring worse labor market
outcomes for majority members (if there is competition in the
local labor market). Greater non-majority presence in the local
area may also align with worsening of the labor market
position of first- and second-generation individuals as the
pool of workers substitutable with one another directly
increases.
Research Expectation 2: Salience of the Threat to Political
Power. The residence in the ethnic enclave may be associated with
greater propensity to vote for the far right for majority members
(if there is conflict). Similar outcomes can be witnessed among
the second generation, whose position can also be threatened by
the growing presence of migrants. As migrants frequently do not
possess political power, the threat to them should be weaker.
Conflict and threat can be important mediators of the
relationship between the enclave and the outcomes in our
study. We use several measures of conflict to capture this
mechanism. Fear of crime (a subjective measure of conflict)
can be strong in areas which majority members perceive as
dominated by outgroupers (individuals belonging to an ethnic
group other than their own) as shown by studies both in
Europe and the United States (Semyonov et al., 2012; Laméris
et al., 2018). Crime levels are usually lower in areas with
greater presence of migrants (Han and Piquero, 2021), but we
also control for whether the respondent reports being a victim
of crime (an objective measure of conflict). Finally, the
economic deprivation of the region and the respondent’s
personal precarious economic position have been linked to
anti-minority sentiments and the ability to cope with
adversity (Haaland and Roth, 2020; Kawalerowicz, 2021).
Using these measures, we formulate the following research
expectation.
Research Expectation 3: Conflict Mechanism: If the ethnic
enclave is characterized by higher levels of conflict and economic
hardship, a negative impact of the local area will be observed that
is not due to its ethnic homogeneity but to concentrated
disadvantage and conflict. We investigate the role of several
mediating factors often considered as part of the threat
framework.
Furthermore, individuals who are in a weaker or precarious
economic position may be particularly susceptible to narratives of
opposition between majorities and migrants and minorities
(Haaland and Roth, 2020) which will express itself in
identification with far-right projects and dissatisfaction with
democracy. We investigate whether the threat to political
power is mediated by the economic position of the
individual—whether they are employed or not, or by the
quality of their jobs.
The Contact Mechanism
Enclaves may also affect the economic and political power of
different groups by shaping the ties respondents form,
particularly of migrants and minorities who would be more
likely to form contacts with other minorities but have fewer
opportunities to engage in bridging ties with the majority,
especially if they reside in an enclave (Vervoort et al., 2012;
Danzer and Yaman, 2013). Areas in which encounters with the
majority are few may lead to a further rejection of outgroupers on
both sides (Vervoort et al., 2012; Skvoretz, 2013). Tie formation
strongly affects the labor market outcomes of migrants and
second-generation individuals as has been shown by previous
research. Bridging ties foster further sociocultural integration of
migrants by improving language skills and can be particularly
important to second-generation minority members, as bridging
may affect the sharing of information and the presence of useful
social networks (Chiswick, 2009; Semyonov and Glikman, 2009;
Lancee and Hartung, 2012; Vervoort, 2012; Danzer and Yaman,
2013). Lack of bridging ties in the second generation is seen as
particularly problematic by policymakers (Cameron, 2011) and
may signal the existence of long-term inclusion issues
(Koopmans, 2010).
Research Expectation 4: Importance of Ties for Labor Market
Outcomes. We do not expect bridging contacts to impact the
labor market position of majority members, but the previous
literature suggests that they are crucial for the successful
economic insertion of migrants and the second generation.
Lack of such bridging ties may be responsible for the observed
economic enclave penalty among migrants and the second
generation.
Research Expectation 5: Importance of Ties for Political
Outcomes. Bridging ties to outgroupers may act to reduce
feelings of social distance on the part of majority members
and can be positively associated with satisfaction with
democracy and negatively associated with voting for the far
right. Bonding among migrants and minorities may represent
a reaction to defend ethnic boundaries, especially under
conditions of discrimination. We should see then that migrant
and minority bonding ties are associated with reduced likelihood
to vote for far-right projects which usually position themselves in
conflict with these groups.
There can also be important differences between migrants and
the second generation. Established groups born in the immigrant
society may feel that their interests align closely with those of
majority members and may also fear exposure to competition
with migrants (Martin, 2015). Migrants may also benefit more
from possible support within the ethnic enclave, while this is less
the case for the second generation. Our study is well-placed to
explore these differences.
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DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Data and Main Concepts
Outcomes
We study three main labor market outcomes to capture threat to
economic power: activity, employment, and job quality measured as
occupational status (Ganzeboom et al., 1992). We use three main
variables tomeasure threat to political power: first, whether someone
voted for a right-wing nationalist party in the last national elections;
second, whether someone feels closest to a right-wing party. We
follow the work by Eger and Valdez (2015) in classifying parties.1 As
a third measure, we include an 11-point scale of satisfaction with
democracy in the country of survey, ranging from extremely
dissatisfied to extremely satisfied. We consider these outcomes for
first-generation migrants, second-generation individuals, and
majority members separately.2 We use the European Social
Survey (ESS), a cross-national representative dataset which
included modules on immigration in 20023 and 20144 and
include the EU-15 member states as well as Norway.5 Migrants
are defined as respondents born in another country and with at least
one parent born abroad; the second-generation individuals are
defined as those born in the country of residence with at least
one parent born abroad; and majority members are themselves born
in the country as well as their parents.We excludemajoritymembers
who self-report as an ethnicminority and restrict the sample to those
aged 16–60 years who are not in education or retired. After listwise
deletion of missing cases, the sample consists of 28,508 respondents,
of whom 2,421 are first-generation migrants and 1,842 are second
generation.
Defining the Ethnic Enclave
In 2002 and 2014, respondents were asked how they would
describe the local area where they currently live6 in terms of
the presence of members of a minority race or ethnic group with
the following answer categories: almost none, some, or many. We
dichotomize this variable to distinguish respondents living in an
ethnic enclave—an area with high concentration of migrant and
minorities from those with some or almost none. Around 10% of
the majority, 25% of migrants, and 19% of the second-generation
individuals live in these ethnic enclaves.
Using self-reported presence of minorities brings the risk that the
perception of minority presence differs across individuals, and the
same area may be classified differently by different people.
Problematically, minority presence may be perceived to be higher
by those for whom it is seen as an issue. While we would ideally use
the share of migrants or minorities in the local area, no cross-
nationally comparative European data exist at the local level.
Descriptively, we can compare the regional reported average of
living in an ethnic enclave to the actual share of first- and
second-generation individuals in a region (NUTS-1 and NUTS-2:
much higher than the perceived local area), obtained from the EU
Labour Force Survey (LFS) ad hoc modules of 2008 and 2014, as
shown in Supplementary Figure A1 in the supplementary material.
This does indeed show that the probability of a respondent living in
an ethnic enclave is higher in regions with objectively more migrants
and second-generation individuals (r  0.56).
Variants of this measure were used to study the relation
between residential concentration of minorities and contact,
migrant attitudes, and feelings of safety (Semyonov and
Glikman, 2009; Semyonov et al., 2012). It is clear that while
there is subjectivity in this measure, it is particularly important to
consider subjective perceptions when estimating the impact of
residing in such local areas; and it is also clear that there is a link
to the objective reality.
Descriptive statistics of all variables can be found in
Supplementary Table A1 in the supplementary material.
Methodological Strategy
Main Effect
We cannot randomly assign individuals to live in an ethnic enclave.
Instead, we can study the difference in outcomes that are observed
for an individual living in such an enclave and an individual who is
not but is otherwise very similar by matching them on a range of
covariates (that are likely to have driven residential selection in the
first place).7 First, we estimate the effect (Δ) of living in an ethnic
enclave on economic position or threat to political power after
accounting for selection into these areas—this estimate is hereafter
designed the “treatment.” The effect is the difference between the
outcome y when living in an ethnic enclave T (y1) and when not
living in the enclave (y0) as shown in Eq. 2. As both outcomes cannot
be observed simultaneously, the potential outcomes are estimated
using propensity score matching (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). We
estimate the effect of living in the enclave separately for majority
members, migrants, and minorities.
△  (y1 | T  1) − (y0 | T  0) (1)
p(x)  Pr(T  1 | X  x) (2)
The propensity score p(x) indicates the probability of living in an
ethnic enclave conditional on the observed characteristics X, as
1The parties are the SPO in Austria, Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang, and FN in
Belgium. The ODS in Czechia, the Danish People’s Party in Denmark, True Finns
in Finland, FN in France, Lega Nord in Italy, Progress Party in Norway, law and
justice in Poland, National Renovator Party in Portugal, the List Pim Fortuyn and
PVV in the Netherlands, the AfD and NPD in Germany, UKIP in the
United Kingdom, and Sverigedemokrate in Sweden.
2By partitioning the sample into three separate groups based on rough categories of
country of birth of self and parents, we aim to compare like with like as much as the
sample size allows. These groups are of course still very diverse and differ in
composition across countries, which we address through the matching approach.
3European Social Survey Round 1 Data (2002). Data file edition 6.5.
NSD–Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway–Data Archive and
distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.
4European Social Survey Round 7 Data (2014). Data file edition 2.1.
NSD–Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway–Data Archive and
distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.
5Greece, Italy, and Luxembourg were not involved in the 2014 round.
6Respondents are asked: “How would you describe the area where you currently
live?”While referring to people’s own perception of the neighborhood, the scale of
this local area is unknown and may differ across respondents.
7This still cannot account for selection on unobservable characteristics however,
which is addressed more in the sensitivity tests.
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shown in Eq. 2 (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). In order to compare
like with like, we include year of survey, country of residence, and
dummies for living in a big city; the outskirts or suburbs of a big city,
a town, or small city, or in a more rural environment; and
sociodemographic characteristics that can affect labor market
outcomes and selection into localities (highest qualification,
gender, age, marital and family situation, an indicator of having
poor health, the highest qualification obtained by a parent,
occupational class of the highest-status parent when the
respondent was aged 14 years, and a dummy indicating whether
the respondent lived with both parents at age 14 years). Formigrants
and the second generation, we also include a dummy indicating
whether one of their parents is born in the host country. For
migrants, the years of residence are also included.8
Several matching algorithms were tested (not shown here),
and the best balance overall as well as an acceptable match for all
instances was obtained by matching on five nearest neighbors
with replacement.
Mechanisms (the Effect of Mediators)
In a second step, we include proxies for conflict and contact to the
variables on which individuals are matched. This means that we are
comparing peoplewho live in an ethnic enclavewith their counterparts
who do not, but who have similar levels of local conflict, or of contact
with majority and minority members. The extent to which this
changes the estimated treatment effect can indicate whether these
mechanisms play a role in the observed differences.
Conflict is measured through factors that can indicate strife and
competition. First, we include the employment rate at the regional
level9 estimated through the EU Labour Force Survey (LFS) in 2002
and 2014 to account for resources in the local labor market, a
commonly adopted measure in economic studies (Manacorda
et al., 2012), and overall deprivation. The region is much larger
than the locality, but it does provide some indication of differences in
resources and opportunities across the sample. Second, we include a
dummy variable indicating that the respondent was a victim of
burglary or assault in the last 5 years—crime being an oft-cited
indicator of conflict in the literature, and third is a dummy
indicating whether respondents feel unsafe walking alone at night
in their local area.
Contact is approximated by including a dummy variable
indicating whether respondents speak the host country
language as their main language to proxy sociocultural
integration and by a question measuring close friendships with
migrants/minorities.10 The question on language varies very little
among the majority, but this mechanism would not be expected
to affect them.
Furthermore, in order to study whether the association
between living in an ethnic enclave and political outcomes is
due to economic uncertainty and deprivation, we test whether
matching workers on an indicator of their economic
outcomes—being active, being employed in low-status jobs
(lowest 25% of occupational status), being employed in
middle-status jobs (middle 50% of occupational status), or
being employed in high-status jobs (highest 25% of
occupational status)—produces an effect on the relationship.
Sensitivity Tests
We test the robustness of our findings, including their sensitivity to
unobserved confounders. While the propensity score matching
accounts for selection on observed characteristics, there may be
selection on unobserved characteristics such as motivation or
preferences which can affect both the probability of living in an
ethnic enclave and labor market outcomes, and thereby bias the
estimated effect. We test the robustness of these results to three
simulated unobserved binary confounders (Rosenbaum, 2005;
Nannicini, 2007), mimicking the relations of three strong
confounders: having tertiary qualifications, feeling unsafe when
walking in the local area at night, and a self-reported measure on
whether the household struggles financially. Our overall findings are
supported;more results can be found Supplementary Tables A4–A6
in Supplementary Appendix S1 in the supplemental material.
We further estimate the difference between living in an ethnic
enclave and living outside of an ethnic enclave when using
different specifications of the matching process.
RESULTS: THREAT TO ECONOMIC
POSITION AND POLITICAL POWER
Descriptive Results
Table 1 shows the differences between individuals residing in the
ethnic enclave and those outside it. Notably, across the three ethnic
categorizations we consider majorities, migrants, and the second
generation, those who are living in the enclave are doing worse in
terms of their labor market outcome, while being more likely to
vote for the far right, identify with the far right, and be satisfiedwith
democracy. Majority and minority members are very similar in
terms of level of activity and employment, and minority members
have better status. Migrants have worse employment outcomes,
than majority or second-generation members while they are much
less likely to vote for the far right and have more satisfaction with
democracy. There is clear evidence of bonding in the ethnic enclave
for both the first generation and for minority individuals and
reduced likelihood to adopt the language of the country of origin as
the main language spoken at home.
Economic Enclave Penalty
Mean and Matched Difference: Threat to Economic
Position
Table 2 compares the average difference in activity, employment,
and occupational status between those living in an ethnic enclave
8Within the last year; 1–5 years ago; 6–10 years ago; 11–20 years ago; more than
20 years ago.
9Unfortunately, the survey contains no local labor market identifiers at a lower level
than the region. We therefore use regional employment rate as a proxy, following
standard practice in the literature (Manacorda et al., 2012).
10In 2002, respondents were asked if they have any close friends who are
immigrants, and in 2014, they were asked whether they have any close friends
who are of a different race or ethnic group from most people in the country. While
these questions are different, they are included jointly to measure strong ties with
minorities and are dichotomized to contrast having many minority/immigrant
friends with having few or none.
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and their counterparts (mean difference), with the treatment
estimate after matching (matched difference). Residents of ethnic
enclaves are on average less likely to be active, 5–10 percentage
points less likely to be employed, and migrants and especially
second-generation individuals living in enclaves also work on
low-quality jobs on average than those living in mixed or
majority-dominated areas.
Selection clearly matters and is important to take into
account, as the inhabitants of ethnic enclaves are generally
lower educated, female, less healthy, young, and of lower
parental social class. Living in an ethnic enclave is also
much more likely for residents of big cities than in small
towns or rural areas. We find that matching on the propensity
score resulted in good balance of covariates between the
enclave residents and non-enclave residents.11
Supplementary Table A2 in the supplementary material
shows the selection equation, and Supplementary Table
A3 shows the averages of the covariates before and after
matching.
After accounting for selection on observables between
respondents, the estimated differences between residents and
nonresidents of enclaves diminish (see Table 2). Particularly,
for majority members, the negative association of living in an
ethnic enclave with one’s economic position is to a large extent
driven by a range of other factors such as individual
sociodemographics, but we still observe slightly poorer
employment prospects for majority members. In contrast,
Figure 1 shows that substantial negative effects remain for
migrants after the matching: Migrants residing in ethnic
enclaves are 3.5 percentage points less likely to be active and
almost 7 percentage points less likely to be employed, while second-
generation individuals work on lower quality jobs (occupational
status reduces by 2.5 points, which is a 5% reduction in status
relative to the average occupational status [48.5] of second-
generation individuals living outside of ethnic enclaves).
Living in an ethnic enclave does not seem to threaten the
economic power of majority members very strongly, while our
results align with interpretations of competition within the
migrant pool for jobs and in terms of job quality for the
second generation.
TABLE 1 | Average labor market and political outcomes for those living in ethnic enclave and those who do not.
Majority Migrants Second generation
Not in enclave Ethnic enclave Not in enclave Ethnic enclave Not in enclave Ethnic enclave
Active 0.90 (0.30) 0.88 (0.32) 0.88 (0.32) 0.83 (0.38) 0.90 (0.30) 0.90 (0.30)
Employed 0.92 (0.27) 0.88 (0.33) 0.89 (0.32) 0.8 (0.40) 0.92 (0.28) 0.82 (0.39)
Occupational status 46.82 (18.88) 46.16 (19.11) 43 (20.61) 40.74 (20.05) 48.47 (18.8) 43.67 (19.16)
Vote far right 0.06 (0.24) 0.09 (0.29) 0.01 (0.11) 0.03 (0.16) 0.05 (0.23) 0.05 (0.23)
Feel close to far right 0.06 (0.23) 0.08 (0.27) 0.04 (0.2) 0.04 (0.2) 0.07 (0.25) 0.09 (0.28)
Satisfied with democracy 5.61 (2.33) 5.01 (2.56) 6.36 (2.36) 6.1 (2.48) 5.64 (2.39) 5.07 (2.56)
Feel unsafe when walking in local area after dark 0.14 (0.35) 0.33 (0.47) 0.15 (0.36) 0.31 (0.46) 0.17 (0.37) 0.34 (0.47)
Victim of burglary/assault last 5 years 0.22 (0.42) 0.3 (0.46) 0.22 (0.42) 0.24 (0.43) 0.24 (0.43) 0.33 (0.47)
Employment rate in regional area (centered) 0.08 (5.17) −1.12 (5.85) 0.48 (4.65) −0.82 (5) 0.85 (3.83) 0.05 (4.51)
Several immigrant/minority friends 0.12 (0.33) 0.21 (0.4) 0.48 (0.5) 0.58 (0.49) 0.25 (0.44) 0.47 (0.5)
A few immigrant/minority friends 0.39 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49) 0.35 (0.48) 0.31 (0.46) 0.44 (0.5) 0.33 (0.47)
No immigrant/minority friends 0.49 (0.5) 0.38 (0.49) 0.17 (0.37) 0.11 (0.32) 0.31 (0.46) 0.2 (0.4)
Speak country language at home 0.98 (0.15) 0.97 (0.16) 0.57 (0.49) 0.45 (0.5) 0.94 (0.23) 0.88 (0.32)
Note: The table shows the average and standard deviation of labor market outcomes and political outcomes, by origin and whether they live in an ethnic enclave.
TABLE 2 | Difference in labor market activity, employment status, and occupational status of inhabitants of ethnic enclaves and those in majority areas.
Majority Migrants Second generation
Active (%) Mean difference −1.55** (0.65) −4.88*** (1.59) −0.59 (1.77)
Matched difference −0.22 (0.72) −3.46** (1.75) −2.32 (1.65)
N treated | control 2,441 | 21,721 596 | 1807 345 | 1486
Employed (%) Mean difference −4.55*** (0.62) −8.927 (1.74) −9.98*** (1.9)
Matched difference −1.68** (0.8) −6.69*** (2.12) −.58 (2.86)
N treated | control 2,152 | 19,487 496 | 1592 310 | 1344
Status Mean difference −0.68 (0.46) −2.36** (1.17) −5.07*** (1.31)
Matched difference −0.63 (0.44) −0.84 (1.09) −2.56** (1.24)
N treated | control 1864 | 17,692 393 | 1392 250 | 1218
*: p < 0.1; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01; The mean difference is estimated through an independent samples t-test (two-tailed), and the matched difference shows the estimate after propensity
score matching with five nearest neighbors, taking individual sociodemographic factors into account.
11The percentage bias for all covariates is substantially reduced and at acceptable
thresholds, less than 5%. There is no longer any statistically significant (p < 0.1)
relation between the matched covariates and the probability of living in an ethnic
enclave after matching.
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Mediation: Conflict and Contact in Relation to
Economic Position
In this section, we test our conflict and contact hypotheses.
Table 2 shows how the difference between those living in an
ethnic enclave and their counterparts who do not changes when
we also compare them to people experiencing a similar level of
conflict or contact.12
The first column of Table 3 shows that majority members who
are living in an ethnic enclave are 1.7 percentage points less likely
to be employed than non-enclave majority members. This
difference is not affected much when accounting for conflict
or contact with minorities. This result is not driven by poorer
regional employment prospects or feelings of threat. There is no
impact on activity or occupational status.
Migrants who live in an ethnic enclave are less likely to be
active (3.5 percentage points) and less likely to be employed than
their counterparts who live in an area with more majority
members. These differences seem partly driven by migrants
having fewer contacts with the majority—meaning more
minority friends and speaking the language less well—than
their counterparts who live elsewhere. When accounting for
contact, the difference in activity is reduced by 1 percentage
point and no longer statistically significant, while the
employment gap is reduced by 1.5 percentage point. The
employment gap is also driven by conflict, as it was for the
majority.
Finally, for the second generation, we see that contact does not
explain their worse quality jobs and lower employment
probability. Accounting for conflict in the area does seem to
account for around 30% of the gap in occupational status.
There have been concerns that in line with classic conflict
literature (Bobo, 1988), conflict may operate asymmetrically.
Majority members who have more to lose in terms of their
political and economic power should be more susceptible to
conflict, particularly to concerns about crime. Yet, we find an
economic enclave penalty however not for majority members but
for migrants and minority members after taking into account
mediators such as conflict and contact. Our results suggest that
FIGURE 1 | Labor market status for inhabitants of an ethnic enclave and those living elsewhere—by migrant status. The mean difference is estimated through an
independent samples t-test (two-tailed), and the matched difference shows the estimate after propensity score matching with five nearest neighbors, taking individual
sociodemographic factors into account. Outcome variables activity, employment, and occupational status are examined and the difference between enclave and non-
enclave residents reported.
12In results not shown here but available upon request, we also look at the
association between living in an ethnic niche and our indicators of conflict or
contact. Majority members who live in an ethnic enclave are also substantially
more likely to report feeling unsafe when walking around at night and to have been
a victim of burglary or assault in the last 5 years, consistent with previous studies
(Glikman and Semyonov, 2012; Laméris et al., 2018). Residing in an ethnic enclave
for migrants is associated with higher probability of feeling unsafe and with living
in a region with a higher unemployment rate. Migrants residing in ethnic enclaves
are also substantially more likely to have many minority friends. Second-
generation individuals living in an ethnic enclave are more likely to be victims
of crime and to feel unsafe similarly to majority members, and are much more
likely to have many minority friends in enclave areas.
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living in an ethnic enclave is particularly bad for migrants’
employment and for the job quality prospects of the second
generation, and this can be exacerbated through isolation from
the mainstream due to the formation of primarily bonding ties.
We next turn to threat to political power that the enclave
can posit.
Political Enclave Penalty
Mean and Matched Differences: Threat to Political
Power
Table 4 shows that after accounting for selection on
observables, living in an ethnic enclave is significantly
associated with the probability of having voted for a right-
wing nationalist party in the last national elections and feeling
close to such a party, and it diminishes satisfaction with
democracy. Importantly, members of the majority who live
in an ethnic enclave are 2 percentage points more likely to
have voted for far-right parties in the last elections than their
counterparts who do not live in such an enclave (compared to
the average propensity of 6% for majority members living
outside of an ethnic enclave, this constitutes a 40% increase)—
Figure 2 demonstrates just how substantial this effect is on the
average probability of voting for the far right. There is no
corresponding association observed for migrants or the
second generation. The association for the majority is
slightly weaker (and not statistically significantly different
from 0 or from the association for the second generation)
when looking at whether they feel closest to a far-right party
rather than to another party. Both majority and second-
generation minority members residing in an ethnic enclave
tend to be less satisfied with the state of democracy in their
country than those who live in mixed or predominantly
majority settings. Thus, we find strong evidence that
residence in an enclave is associated with increased salience
of oppositional political narratives on the part of majority
members and with dissatisfaction with democracy for both
majority and minority members.
Mediation: Conflict and Contact in Relation to Political
Power
Table 5 shows the mediation effect of conflict, contact with
minorities, and personal economic situation on political
outcomes.13 Feelings of threat and conflict in the local area
do give rise to some of these associations, but even when
comparing inhabitants of an ethnic enclave to non-enclave
residents with similar feelings of threat, many of the
associations remain. Notably, accounting for employment
TABLE 3 | Conflict and contact mediating the relationship between ethnic enclaves and labor market outcomes.
Majority First generation Second generation
Active (%) Effect of ethnic enclave −0.22 (0.72) −3.46** (1.75) −2.32 (1.65)
When accounting for conflict −0.05 (0.74) −3.46* (1.9) −3.25* (1.67)
When accounting for contact −0.45 (0.73) −2.62 (2.01) −2.03 (1.72)
Employed (%) Effect of ethnic enclave −1.68** (0.8) −6.69*** (2.12) −4.58 (2.86)
When accounting for conflict −1.82** (0.83) −6.13*** (2.19) −3.03 (2.77)
When accounting for contact −1.86** (0.81) −5.08** (2.16) −6.39** (2.64)
Status Effect of ethnic enclave −0.63 (0.44) −0.84 (1.09) −2.56** (1.24)
When accounting for conflict −0.89** (0.45) 0.24 (1.1) −3.53*** (1.27)
When accounting for contact −0.68 (0.44) −0.01 (1.03) −3.19** (1.39)
Note: This shows the estimated difference between those living in an ethnic enclave and their counterparts who live in amore homogeneouslymajority area. People arematched on country
and sociodemographic background. To account for conflict, we include feelings of unsafety, being a victim of crime, and regional unemployment rate. To account for contact, we include
friendshipties with minority members and language skills.*: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01.
TABLE 4 | Difference in voting and political attitudes for inhabitants of ethnic enclaves and those in majority areas.
Majority First generation Second generation
Vote far right (%) Mean difference 2.7*** (0.66) 1.43* (0.76) 0.24 (1.58)
Matched difference 2.09** (0.83) 0.79 (1.02) 0.4 (1.78)
N treated | control 1559 | 14,494 378 | 990 253 | 1002
Feel close to far right (%) Mean difference 2.52*** (0.63) −0.11 (1.23) 2.11 (1.8)
Matched difference 1.31 (0.82) −0.74 (1.42) 1.59 (2.14)
N treated | control 1559 | 14,494 378 | 990 253 | 1002
Left–right (0–10) Mean difference −0.59*** (0.05) −0.25** (0.12) −0.59*** (0.15)
Matched difference −0.35*** (0.06) −0.02 (0.13) −0.43** (0.17)
N treated | control 2,409 | 21,348 562 | 1732 339 | 1462
*: p < 0.1; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01; The mean difference is estimated through an independent samples t-test (two-tailed), and the matched difference shows the estimate after propensity
score matching with five nearest neighbors, taking individual sociodemographic factors into account.
13Personal economic situation is a combined variable with five categories: inactive,
employed, working on a job in the lowest 25% of occupational status, working on a
job in the middle 50% of occupational status, and working on a job in the top 25%
of occupational status.
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org July 2021 | Volume 6 | Article 6603788
Demireva and Zwysen Ethnic Enclaves, Economic and Political Threat
differences does not dent the pattern for majority
members—that is to say, it is not just those who are
unemployed or in a low occupational position that are likely
to vote for the far right. Accounting for conflict—economic
insecurity and crime—reduces the gap in satisfaction with
democracy substantially for the majority and for the second
generation. For the latter, the difference is no longer statistically
significant. Conflict seems then to be the major driver of the
political dissatisfaction of the second generation in ethnic
enclaves but not for the majority. Conflict and accounting of
personal economic insecurity reduce the size of the estimate for
the second generation, but it does not disappear.
FIGURE 2 | Voting behavior and satisfaction with democracy for inhabitants of an ethnic enclave and those living elsewhere—by migrant status. The mean
difference is estimated through an independent samples t-test (two-tailed), and the matched difference shows the estimate after propensity score matching with five
nearest neighbors, taking individual sociodemographic factors into account. Outcome variables voting behavior and satisfaction with democracy are examined and the
difference between enclave and non-enclave residents reported.
TABLE 5 | Conflict, contact, and employment status mediating the relationship between ethnic enclaves and voting and political behavior.
Majority First generation Second generation
Vote far right (%) Effect of ethnic enclave 2.09** (0.83) 0.79 (1.02) 0.4 (1.78)
When accounting for conflict 2.21*** (0.83) 0.37 (1.33) −0.95 (1.86)
When accounting for contact 2.99*** (0.8) 1.96** (0.91) 0.87 (1.66)
When accounting for employment 2.02** (0.83) 1.71* (0.88) 0 (1.9)
Feel close to far right (%) Effect of ethnic enclave 1.31 (0.82) −0.74 (1.42) 1.59 (2.14)
When accounting for conflict 1.61** (0.81) 0.48 (1.21) 0.24 (2.05)
When accounting for contact 1.61** (0.8) 1.22 (1.2) 1.98 (2.05)
When accounting for employment 1.7** (0.8) −0.21 (1.36) 2.09 (2.47)
Satisfaction with democracy (0–10) Effect of ethnic enclave −0.35*** (0.06) −0.02 (0.13) −0.43** (0.17)
When accounting for conflict −0.21*** (0.06) −0.06 (0.13) −0.26 (0.16)
When accounting for contact −0.34*** (0.06) −0.14 (0.13) −0.35** (0.16)
When accounting for employment −0.34*** (0.06) −0.03 (0.13) −0.33** (0.16)
Note: This shows the estimated difference between those living in an ethnic enclave and their counterparts who live in amore homogeneouslymajority area. People arematched on country
and sociodemographic background. To account for conflict, we include feelings of unsafety, being a victim of crime, and regional unemployment rate. To account for contact, we include
friendshipties with minority members and language skills. Employment includes a combined variable on being inactive, employed in low-quality jobs, employed in middle-status jobs, or
employed in a high-status job. *: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01.
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CONCLUSION
Using the 2002 and 2014 waves of the ESS, we find that, before we
account for compositional differences, living in a perceived ethnic
enclave is on average positively associated with the threat to economic
power—activity, employment, and occupational status for all groups
we examine. This is the case for majority members as well as for
migrants and the second generation. Importantly, however, after
matching on a rich set of individual variables to account for social
selection, the employment enclave penalty disappears for majority
members. However, living in the ethnic enclave is associated with
poorer labor market outcomes for migrants and their descendants,
and these findings are robust to many different specifications,
including to unobserved characteristics. Lack of opportunity for
contact seems the prime driver behind the enclave economic
penalty of minorities (in terms of job quality) and migrants (in
terms of activity and employment).
On the contrary, we have provided evidence that residing in an
enclave appears to solidify the political concerns of majority
members, and they are more likely (by 2 percentage points) to
vote for far-right parties in such settings and to be dissatisfied
with democracy. Such pattern of dissatisfaction with democracy
is also notable among minority members.
This research has several limitations. First of all, we study the effect
of the perceived composition of the ethnic enclave—unfortunately, we
do not have information about the actual ethnic diversity of the local
area. Additional tests we have performed and which are available in
the Supplementary information show that there is an alignment
between the ethnic composition of the region and the perceptions
of ethnic heterogeneity captured in the ESS, which gives us some
degree of confidence in the measure we have used. Second, it is
possible that conflict arises between particular ethnic groups. Our
approach does not allow for subtle differentiation between ethnic
minority groups or indeed to reflect on increasing levels of xenophobia
that some groups, Muslim groups in particular, may be exposed to
(Allen, 2010; Marfouk, 2019). Further work should aim to explore
these important aspects of enclave residence to better examine the
postulates of the threat framework. Finally, we do not know the ethnic
composition of the respondents’ workplaces or whether they reside
and work in the same location. We nevertheless can comment on
whether on average the diversity of the local area, in fact the substantial
(perceived) presence of minorities, undermines the employment
prospects of majority individuals—it does not.
Our study shows that in the European context, increased
migrant and minority presence in the local area does not seem
to be a viable economic threat for majority members, but ethnic
enclaves and the isolation in them are associated with poorer
employment prospects for both migrants and minorities. The
interpretation of our results however aligns with observations of
political commentators that majority members may experience
their political power threatened and act to redress the balance by
voting for a far-right party in such local areas. Exposure to the
ethnic enclave may not only isolate the second generation from
the occupational hierarchies of the mainstream labor market but
also serve to consolidate their dissatisfaction with democracy.
Notably, one’s personal economic position does not seem to
mediate our results for threat to political power, suggesting that
the actual economic situation of the respondent is not the
mechanism underlying this phenomenon.
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